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A B S T R A C T : 
The transposition of the EU Directive on Network and Information Security 
(NIS) by EU Member States involved assigning a set of responsibilities to op-
erators, regulators and policy makers within a national cybersecurity strategy, 
in order to improve cybersecurity levels across critical infrastructures. This re-
search investigates the perspectives and experiences of organisations af-
fected by the NIS Directive focussing on three different sectors (Energy, Water 
& Aviation). The authors evaluate the response of different actors to NIS in-
terventions and their challenges in meeting their assigned responsibilities, in 
particular their ability to oversee supply chain cybersecurity. It proposes fur-
ther support for partnerships and cooperation across organisations to in-
crease the effectiveness of NIS implementation. Based on results from semi-
structured interviews and observations of industry working groups, an ap-
proach to supply chain oversight to achieve a balance between control and 
cooperation is recommended, to improve cybersecurity within industry sec-
tors and across critical national infrastructures. Although our initial focus has 
been on working mainly with UK stakeholders, we argue that our recommen-
dations have a more general application beyond those countries directly af-
fected by the Directive. 
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1.1 Regulation of Critical Infrastructure  
The EU Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Di-
rective) was introduced in 2016 to raise the cybersecurity level of Critical Na-
tional Infrastructures (CNI) across EU Member States.1 A reform of the Directive 
was proposed by the European Commission in December 2020 known as 
NIS2.0.2 The original objectives of the NIS Directive are still considered as very 
relevant: 
• to increase the capabilities of Member States in mitigating cybersecurity 
risks and handling incidents 
• to improve the level of cooperation amongst Member States in cybersecu-
rity and the protection of essential services 
• to promote a culture of cybersecurity across all sectors vital for our econ-
omy and society. 
It applies to industries providing essential services to society such as Energy, 
Water, Transport, Health and Finance. The interpretation of which companies 
fall within scope across these industries is a matter for individual member 
states. The NIS Directive places a responsibility on national Governments to se-
cure their essential services. The transposition of the NIS Directive by each na-
tional Government decides the services considered essential for their nation 
and applies the regulation to the public or private operators of those services. 
It was transposed into UK law in 2018 as the NIS Regulations. These regula-
tions are still in place following the UK’s departure from the European Union 
and will be reviewed by the UK Government during 2021.The UK National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC) produced a collection of guidance for the implementa-
tion of the UK NIS Regulations. Figure 1 outlines the principles and objectives 
that are defined in the NIS Guidance Collection.3 This paper evaluates the re-
sponse of different actors to these NIS Objectives & Principles and their chal-
lenges in meeting this intervention. 
The original NIS principles are further outlined in Table 1; this provides an 
overview of what is expected of each operator of essential services as defined 
under the NIS Regulations. The NIS Directive introduced key roles and responsi-
bilities as listed in Table 2. 
The NIS Directive expects national Governments to have a National Cyberse-
curity Strategy with the goal of improving the cybersecurity level of their critical 
infrastructure and securing the services essential to their society. Figure 2 
shows how the UK’s implementation of this high-level strategy engaged organ-
isations and activities across the public and private sector and demonstrates the 
full extent of the supply chain being positioned within OES responsibilities. This 
supply chain includes the hardware, software and systems being used by oper-
ators to provide their essential services such as water or electricity supply or 
transport services. It can include systems integrators who are configuring be-
spoke designs; providers carrying out maintenance for an operational facility or  




Figure 1: NIS Objectives & Principles.4 
 
 
support services for IT or Operational Technology (OT). The supply chain could 
also include consultants providing relevant expertise to an OES. It is up to the 
OES to decide what is in scope of the NIS Regulation by defining the critical as-
sets and suppliers that their essential service is dependent upon. 
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provides overall guidance by 
producing indicators of good practice that contribute to the outcomes expected 
by the NIS principles and objectives.5 The sectoral Competent Authority (CA) 
 
Table 1. NIS principles.6  
Objective A Appropriate organisational structures, policies, and processes in 
place to understand, assess and systematically manage security risks 
to essential services.  
Objective B Proportionate security measures in place to protect essential services 
and systems from cyber-attack. Includes: identity and access control, 
data and service security, information protection policies and pro-
cesses, protective technology and staff awareness and training.  
Objective C Capabilities to ensure security defences remain effective and to de-
tect cybersecurity events affecting, or with the potential to affect, es-
sential services. Includes security monitoring and anomaly detection.  
Objective D Capabilities to minimise the impacts of a cyber security incident on 
the delivery of essential services including the restoration of those 
services where necessary. Includes response and recovery plans.  
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Table 2. Roles & Responsibilities introduced by the NIS Directive.7  
Role Responsibility 
Operators of Essen-
tial Services (OES)  
Implementing NIS Principles. 
Required to report incidents affecting essential services to 
the Competent Authority.  
Competent Authori-
ties (CA)  
Produce guidance & cybersecurity assurance goals.  
Audit and assess the cybersecurity levels achieved by OES.  
Enforce compliance where necessary.  
Computer Security 
Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRT)  
Provide technical expertise.  
Assistance with cybersecurity incidents.  
Single Point of Con-
tact (SPOC)  
International co-operation and engagement with EU part-
ners.  
Participation in the NIS Cooperation Group. 
 
provides sector specific guidelines and a profile to be achieved that their assess-
ments and audits are based on. In most cases, the nominated CA was the regu-
lator in charge of existing safety oversight. Examples of organisations assigned 
the role of CA under NIS include the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Health & 
Safety Executive (HSE), and the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI). There is a 
reliance on OES to relate this to their specific operational context by defining 
the assets in scope of NIS that their essential service depends upon, assessing 
their current achievement against the provided Cyber Assessment Framework 8 
and creating performance improvement plans that are overseen by the sectoral 
CA. While this process displayed in Figure 2 implies a passing of responsibility 
from the strategic level down to achievement of the goals of the NIS Regula-
tions, our research demonstrates that collaborations and regular interactions 
are required between the private and public organisations involved to manage 
progress and provide assistance. 
1.2 Managing Supply Chain Risks 
The increasing digitalisation of CNI together with a need for more distributed 
forms of control, for instance as a consequence of the pandemic, has increased 
the need for more enhanced supply chain assurance. With many distributed de-
vices and interactions over a mix of infrastructures, establishing a common level 
of mutual trust and security across different administration boundaries be-
comes increasingly important. Reliance on multiple vendors including open-
source providers requires a closer understanding of the varying levels of their 
security so that the context of operational dependencies can inform ongoing 
improvements. Cyber criminals look for the weakest link where there are fewer 
protections in place because a single compromise in the supply chain can enable  




Figure 2: Implementing the National Cybersecurity Strategy for Critical Infrastructure. 
 
access to multiple organisations. A significant proportion of attacks are target-
ing beyond one organisation and intending to achieve access to other organisa-
tions along their supply chain.9 Increasingly the vendors and suppliers used ex-
tend across national borders raising significant concerns about national security 
and “digital sovereignty.” 
The NIS regulations do not directly apply to the supply chain. Instead, there 
is a pass down of responsibility where operators need support from their ven-
dors to achieve adequate cybersecurity and reduce risks to their infrastructure. 
NIS Objective A and principle 4 in the Cyber Assessment Framework requires 
some oversight of OES supply chains. Table 3 shows some of the expected out-
comes to fully achieve this supply chain principle. It requires operators to have 
a deep and broad understanding of their supply chain risks beyond Tier 1 sup-
pliers and to have clearly defined supplier responsibilities as well as achieve a 
mutual commitment from suppliers to resolving incidents.10 
This research, on examining the process of implementing the NIS Directive, 
highlights that OES, as individual organisations, are not in a position to fully se-
cure their infrastructure and services without reaching out in collaboration with 
other organisations to develop sector approaches and to influence improve-
ments in their supply chains. This creates a potential role for the CAs and wider 
government agencies in supporting collaborative approaches to supply chain 
assurance across national industries. There are tensions where this might be 
interpreted as undue interference in market forces; for instance, if a govern-
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Table 3. Achieving NIS Principle A4a Supply Chain.  
Expected outcomes to fully achieve NIS Principle on Supply Chains 
Deep understanding of supply chain, including sub-contractors and wider risks, to 
inform risk assessment and procurement processes.  
Consider risks to essential functions arising from supply chain subversion by capable 
and well-resources attackers.  
Information shared with suppliers, that is essential to operation, is appropriately 
protected from sophisticated attacks.  
Security requirements of suppliers are mutually understood and laid in contracts, 
with a clear and documented shared-responsibility model.  
All network connections and data sharing with third parties is managed effectively 
and proportionately.  
Incident management processes include mutual support with suppliers for the reso-
lution of incidents.  
 
1.3 Supply Chain Compromises 
Recent supply chain attacks demonstrate that suppliers are a potential attack 
route into multiple operators. By compromising one vendor an attacker could 
achieve access to all the vendor’s customers. Operators can also be caught in 
the crossfire of attacks targeted elsewhere due to sharing common vulnerabili-
ties. The inability of suppliers to maintain adequate security over the long life-
span that equipment is used in cyber-physical systems exacerbates the situa-
tion. There can be several steps to an attack, once access is achieved, the at-
tacker could move laterally within the network and reach more critical assets, 
such as operational technologies that control critical infrastructure. Layers of 
security, including segmentation of networks, are essential to minimise the im-
pact of incidents. Urciuoli et al. present examples of supply chain threats to em-
phasise the importance of protecting the supply chain information layer.11 Pan-
dey and Singh describe a range of methods of attacking supply chain systems, 
from pre-installed malware on manufacturer components, to Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks compromising availability of resources, direct attacks to damage 
and destroy services and, in particular, the ease of initial attacks against a third-
party enabling access to their ultimate target.12 
A global supply chain survey by BlueVoyant reported that 80 % of participants 
had experienced a third-party breach during the past year and 77 % have limited 
visibility of their supply chain, with only 2 % managing to monitor their vendors 
in real time or daily. The energy system is becoming more distributed with an 
increasing reliance on third parties. Distributed DoS is a key concern for the en-
ergy sector as well as third-party compromise of their SCADA systems.13 
The continued obligation on OES to maintain their essential services has re-
sulted in them being ideal targets for disruptive attacks such as ransomware. 
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Such attacks block access to important data until a ransom is paid and create an 
urgency to pay with threats to publish the stolen private and confidential infor-
mation within a short timeframe. Several energy firms experienced ransom-
ware attacks in 2020 such as the Ragnar Locker ransomware impacting Portu-
gal’s energy operator EDP, which targeted software used by their Managed Ser-
vice Providers.14 The Netwalker ransomware affected K Electric in Pakistan and 
multinational energy company Enel.15 
Attacks in the water sector have resulted in a diverse set of impacts such as 
polluting water ways, data breaches and theft of irrigation water.16 The water 
sector is dependent on the supply chain for essential chemicals for water treat-
ment and therefore could be impacted by unauthorised intrusion into the or-
dering systems of their suppliers. A recent attack on a water treatment facility 
in Florida attempted to manipulate chemical levels in the water by adjusting set 
points. This attack emphasised the importance of maintaining integrity of sys-
tem configurations, managing remote access to operational facilities as well as 
the human aspect, the anomaly in operational settings was discovered and cor-
rected by a human operator.17 
The aviation sector has experienced DoS attacks on air traffic communication 
channels and malware being introduced by sub-contractors into air traffic man-
agement systems. Airports already give much attention to physical security and 
require equivalent attention to cybersecurity, such as controlling digital access 
to their operational equipment.18 Also, recovering safely from incidents is es-
sential and requires close coordination with IT service providers to ensure safe 
operations are preserved during incident response and recovery.19 
Aviation companies, along with other critical sectors, were alerted to con-
sider their supply chains during the SolarWinds cyber-attack in 2020, which en-
abled the theft of FireEye’s ‘red team’ tools that are used to test client defences 
by emulating adversaries. The attack also targeted the US Federal Government 
and the US Military and was achieved through a malicious software update by 
deploying malware as an update from SolarWinds’ own servers. It was digitally 
signed by a valid digital certificate bearing their name. When customers up-
dated the software, a backdoor was installed into their server. Its impact goes 
far beyond the original targets, after being unknowingly installed by IT adminis-
trators across 18,000 or more organisations. It has also left uncertainties due to 
the exposure of backdoors enabling additional exploits before discovery and 
patching was carried out.20 
Microsoft exchange servers have recently been attacked globally by utilising 
four different vulnerabilities to gain high privileged access to the servers, prior 
to authentication and without valid credentials. Attackers could use this as a 
stepping-stone to reach other parts of the breached network, giving the oppor-
tunity for further exploits such as data theft or installation of malware. This at-
tack demonstrates the importance of having an up-to-date asset inventory to 
find the affected systems quickly and take remedial actions. There can be a time 
lag before patching is possible, especially in operational environments, where it 
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is important to first assess if the patch would have a negative impact on system 
operation.21 
The theft of customer records from credit reporting agency Equifax in 2017 
was achieved due to an open-source software vulnerability. The lessons from 
the Equifax incident showed that implementation and management of security 
is just as important as having security procedures in place. Procedures were in 
place but the software vulnerability had not been patched. There was no net-
work segmentation configured, attackers were able to go from machine to ma-
chine. Role based access control was also not set up, the system gave access to 
all the content once compromised. Anomaly detection for unusual behaviour 
was also not installed, thousands of database queries in rapid sequence was not 
alerted. Despite Equifax having a high spend on security, the actual implemen-
tation of it was inadequate.22 Breaches related to open-source components 
have reduced since the Equifax incident but are still occurring often. In Sona-
type’s survey of software developers 20 % experienced a breach in 2020 that 
was tied to an open-source component.23 Attackers are also not limited to ex-
ploiting the existing vulnerabilities within open-source components. Malicious 
actors now proactively target open-source projects by newly infecting software 
components to distribute malware.24 
The cost of cybercrime to UK businesses is estimated to be £ 21 billion per 
year 25 and the average cost of cybercrime to an organisation is £ 8 million.26 The 
time taken to deal with breaches is a significant issue while staff are prevented 
from carrying out their normal duties.27 In addition to the operational recovery 
effort, company reputations and stock prices are also impacted. 
2. Related Work 
Sobb & Turnbull point out the need for additional research on evaluating the 
risks introduced from supply chains into operational environments and how to 
securely integrate supply chain technologies into such contexts.28 
Other research methods have provided supply chain attack surface diagrams 
to assist with identifying gaps in current practices;29 have modelled threat sce-
narios and potential attacks coming from a supply chain perspective;30 and 
adapted attack graph generation methods to a dynamic supply chain environ-
ment to assist administrators with protecting assets.31 
The international standard IEC62443 describes various aspects of industrial 
cybersecurity, including IEC62443-2-4 which specifies the security capabilities 
required of providers to industrial control systems.32 ENISA provide good prac-
tices for cybersecurity across the supply chain for Internet of Things (IoT).33 
Previous research has recognised that a single entity alone does not possess 
the full capability to respond to cyber threats without some level of cooperation 
with other entities. Polischuk recommends to focus and multiply the necessary 
capability through a flexible and adaptive national security system with effec-
tive communication between the elements of this system.34 
Penchev and Shalamanova propose to establish focus groups under an um-
brella organisation for the necessary cooperation between civilian and military 
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organisations in cybersecurity.35 Other work exemplifies building an integrated 
collaborative information environment for more effective working across or-
ganisations during crisis management and to support decision making at differ-
ent levels of Government.36 This research provides a synthesis of this necessity 
for interorganisational cooperation in cybersecurity with other related works on 
the performance and resilience of supply chains, from supply chain manage-
ment literature that are outlined in Section Error! Reference source not found.. 
This article evaluates the experiences of implementing the NIS Directive 
across the public and private sector. It presents recommendations on supplier 
assurance and offers a timely contribution as the EU proposes to broaden the 
application of the NIS Directive and bring supply chains under the NIS umbrella. 
NIS regulated entities who deliver essential services in the EU will be required 
to “assess and take into account the overall quality of products and cybersecu-
rity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their secure de-
velopment procedures.”37 
3. Research Method 
This research included interviews with organisations in the Energy, Water and 
Transport sectors. The experiences of each of the roles and responsibilities sup-
porting the implementation of the NIS Directive were included. This enabled the 
challenges to be understood from the different perspectives of providers of es-
sential services, their suppliers and regulators. Due to the sensitivity of the topic 
and to investigate different approaches being used and identify the barriers to 
progress, semi-structured interviews and discussions captured the different 
viewpoints. The lead author also participated in industry collaborations and 
working groups that were formulated to progress the supply chain resilience 
effort and to review the progress of the NIS Directive. This assisted in building 
trust with interviewees due to the sensitive nature of cybersecurity. This paper 
is based on semi-structured interviews and observations of industry working 
groups. The names of organisations and participants are not disclosed for con-
fidentiality and anonymity reasons. To draw on the direct experience of opera-
tors implementing their NIS obligations and suppliers impacted by NIS, as well 
as Government guidance and oversight, the spread of participants were as indi-
cated in Table 4. 
To advance academic contribution while also enhancing practical progress, 
this work included some action-based research to assist stakeholders in meet-
ing their objectives under NIS and progress cooperative partnerships in cyber-
security. The semi-structured interviews and participant observation aligns well 
with Whyte’s research methods.38 The interviews looked at business and gov-
ernment priorities; the frameworks being used; and for collaboration and inter-
action across functional areas and between organisations. The main topics of 
questioning included a participant’s overall experience with implementing NIS; 
their interaction with the supply chain and ability to control and manage it; and 
their processes and approach to NIS and managing suppliers. 
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Table 4. Summary of Research Participants.  
Private Sector Participants & Roles Public Sector Participants & Roles 
OES (15 participants) 
Head of Digital Security 
Director of IT 
IS Security 
Data Protection Specialist 
Information Security Officer 
Cyber Risk & Compliance Manager 
OT Systems Managers 




Project Manager Cyber Exercises 
CNI Team, Sector Leads 
Sociotechnical Security Group 
Suppliers (7 participants) 
Solutions Architect 
Systems Integrator 
Cybersecurity Business Lead 
Product Solutions and Security Officer 
General Manager 
Government Policymakers  
(5 participants) 
Cyber Resilience Policy Advisor 
Policy Advisor, Cyber Incentives and 
Regulation 
Cybersecurity Regulatory Policy 
Cyber Resilience Policy Advisor 
Cyber Policy Team 
Sector Collaborations (4 participants) 
Chair of Industry Supplier Assurance 
Working Group 
Industry Association Members 
Competent Authority (8 participants) 
Cybersecurity Oversight Specialist 
Network Security Director 
Cyber R&D Lead 
Inspector 
Specialist Inspector 
Regulation & Governance 
Sector Head of NIS 
Consultants (3 participants) 
Cybersecurity Consultant 
Digital & Data Consultant 
Principal Cyber Consultant 
EU Participants (4 participants) 
Information Security Expert 
Secure Infrastructure & Services 
NIS Stakeholder Reviews 
 
4. Supply Chain Responsibility 
Our interviews in particular uncovered that responsibility for cybersecurity can 
become blurred when there are multiple actors, components and systems in-
volved. There is much work in progress to ensure responsibilities are defined 
and understood. This issue is explored here in the light of related works. 
The IEC standard 62443 states that all actors have a shared responsibility for 
Industrial Control System (ICS) cybersecurity, including suppliers, integrators 
and asset owners: through secure development by suppliers; secure deploy-
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ment by integrators; while asset owners configure, operate and maintain secu-
rity over time.39 
Accountability for cybersecurity remains with the operator asset owner, de-
spite reliance on products and services from the supply chain. The operator re-
tains responsibility for decisions made and the effectiveness of their security 
even if outsourcing for assessment or advice or to a cybersecurity solutions pro-
vider.40 Where responsibility is delegated to a supplier, it is important the ac-
countability for the effectiveness of this approach is retained within the opera-
tor. Management of the delegated responsibilities should include a require-
ment that cybersecurity responsibility sits at a senior level within the supplier 
organisation to ensure senior management support for their security responsi-
bilities.41 
OES identify the critical assets that their essential service depends upon. This 
provides a scope that the NIS Regulations can be applied to and becomes the 
focus for assessment and improvements.42 However, this scope could broaden 
when remote maintenance is carried out or cloud-based services are used, or 
malicious acts affect the system whether through error or through a targeted 
attack. Procedures need to be in place and appropriate layers of protection im-
plemented to ensure the defined scope is resilient when impacted from beyond 
the boundary of its assets.43 Furthermore, methods for authorising connection 
to networks and devices or permitting changes to configurations need to be ef-
fective and appropriate in a real time operational environment. 
5. Cooperation in Managing Supply Chains 
While cybersecurity capability can be built into products, the end-to-end inte-
grated solution needs to be effectively secured involving people, processes and 
technology. There is an inherent need to integrate skillsets to achieve cyberse-
curity. Implementing the NIS Directive has necessarily involved bringing to-
gether different parts of an organisation to identify the assets in scope and set 
in place a continuous process for protection, detection, response and recovery. 
Ideally, this requires a synthesis of IT and OT expertise with sector specific 
knowledge and in addition the suppliers’ deep knowledge of their products and 
services. The following section explores insights from supply chain management 
literature on coordinating and influencing supply chains. 
5.1 Building Collaborations 
Appropriate collaborative strategies involve both social and technological con-
cerns to meet technical requirements and integrate relevant processes be-
tween the organisations involved. Building inter-organizational relationships 
with suppliers is something to be fostered over time to motivate their partici-
pation in collaborative behaviours. Such collaborative effort provides a consid-
erable mediating role in achieving supply chain performance.44 Several industry 
interviews shared the opinion that if they had to resort wholly to contractual 
agreement, it would feel like a failure. Their emphasis, particularly with critical 
suppliers, was on a mutually supportive relationship and a trusted partnership. 
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This mirrors a study of international procurement where contracts were in place 
in most cases but were considered less important than clear communication to 
agree common perceptions and expectations throughout the relationship. 
Close working relationships were more important than a contract in effective 
partnership over time. A mutual commitment showed the potential to achieve 
more than formal agreements.45 
Instead of suppliers acting with self-interest in supply chain systems, Shin and 
Park demonstrate the importance of a broader awareness of a supply chain sys-
tem and a mature partnership development to achieve greater confidence in 
the resiliency of the supply chain. They identify the following attributes as de-
sirable for all supply chain members and forming key elements of resilience ca-
pability and improving a firm’s ability to recover from unexpected events: 
• common interest, a collective goal, going beyond self-interest 
• mutual respect among supply chain partners, competencies and potential 
for achievement are recognised 
• deepening trust, meeting operational standards, displaying goodwill to-
wards the partnership 
• Interaction obligations, participation in formal and informal communica-
tions among partners for supply chain management activities. A lead firm 
influencing actions and behaviours of supply chain members to improve ca-
pabilities.46 
Rather than raising maturity level generally, it is important to align improve-
ment in capability with the actual risk exposure to ensure investments are pro-
portionate, i.e., through matching the level of risk and vulnerability with appro-
priate capability to focus investment and effort on actual resilience gaps.47 This 
concept of a balanced resilience has also been extended to include the supply 
chain network.48 However, there are challenges in knowing the actual risk ex-
posure and the likelihood of incidents and proving whether a cybersecurity in-
vestment has been a worthwhile prevention, particularly if there is an absence 
of incidents. Cooperation is important to bring together information on the lat-
est trend of attacks, along with an understanding of the potential impact, and 
having preventions in place to minimise these types of impact. 
5.2 Reducing Overhead of Supply Chain Coordination 
Attempting to control entire supply chains of cyber secure activity would be a 
vast and costly undertaking. A more achievable endeavour is to strategically de-
cide what aspects to control and what to let emerge. Choi points out the differ-
ences between control and emergence in managing supply chains as complex 
adaptive systems. The use of control mechanisms involves a formal oversight of 
suppliers with contractual arrangements and adherence to common standards 
for more predictable outcomes. Emergence, on the other hand, is where more 
autonomy is given for local decision making and emergence of the required out-
comes is encouraged through positive feedback. Choi proposes, that companies 
managing their supply networks through both control and emergence, outper-
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form those that focus on only one of these approaches. This entails controlling 
the overall direction while remaining vigilant in observing what emerges, to 
make appropriate decisions and changes. Also, encouraging creativity and 
adaptability in the supply network reduces the coordination cost of a supply 
network. Choi suggests controlling several tiers deep only for a few critical areas 
and otherwise allowing the supply network to emerge through empowering top 
tier suppliers to manage their suppliers.49 
Pass through clauses in contracts with Tier 1 suppliers require the supplier’s 
suppliers to have the same protections in place and the contracted supplier is 
held responsible for compliance with this clause. These clauses typically only 
reach Tier1 and Tier 2 suppliers.50 Coordination of a ‘cluster’ of suppliers is more 
realistic than oversight of multiple tiers in the supply chain. Via a lead organisa-
tion this is coordinated from a strategic level with a focus on capability and 
agreed goals, using metrics as an enabler.51 Roseira’s research into supplier net-
works identifies the ability to recognise the potential in each supplier relation-
ship and diffusing this to other supplier relationships as being of central im-
portance in managing portfolios of suppliers.52 Addressing actors beyond Tier 1 
of the supply chain through interactions among multiple actors in a supply net-
work more commonly leads to resilience to supply chain events.53 
The interconnectedness of supply chain actors requires a holistic approach to 
resilience. Knowledge created and shared among supply chain partners to build 
a ‘capacity to adapt’ to continuous change will allow the whole supply chain to 
become more resilient. Colicchia recommends “a holistic and extended ap-
proach.” Awareness training should go beyond the boundaries of the workplace 
to appreciate the extent of impact because human behaviours can affect the 
whole supply chain network.54 Keegan recommends creating opportunities for 
cooperation among private sector organisations and public-private cooperation 
through government involvement in industry working groups, creating forums 
to enable collaboration across organisations and countries.55 Examples of such 
collaboration are described in Section 6. 
6. Perspectives on Implementing NIS 
6.1 Policy Perspective 
Government departments have defined responsibilities and set expectations by 
providing NIS Guidance and a Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF). By describ-
ing indicators of good practice,56 the CAF shows the outcomes to be achieved 
within each of the principles previously shown in Figure 1. 
The evidence supporting the original NIS intervention showed that only 13 % 
of organisations were setting cybersecurity standards for their suppliers to 
meet; and during 2017 19 % had experienced a breach that resulted in a mate-
rial loss.57 The potential benefits expected from implementing the NIS Directive, 
at the outset in April 2018 included the following58: 
• a reduction in risks to essential services due to the improved security level 
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• to improve the cybersecurity of network and information systems (NIS) un-
derpinning essential services 
• to reduce the likelihood and impact of security incidents 
• to also reduce breaches/attacks that are below the Directive thresholds 
• a 5 % reduction in number of organisations with a breach or attack was as-
sumed 
• common security requirements for all market operators 
• the exchange of information and coordination of actions 
• to improve advice and incident response for OES through international co-
operation and information sharing 
• extended benefits were expected to be “substantial where even just one 
significant incident is prevented” due to potential impact on the wider 
economy if essential services and network and information systems be-
come unavailable. 
There was an emphasis on number of incidents and an expectation that im-
plementing the NIS principles would reduce the number of incidents. However, 
it was also observed that it is difficult to determine whether implementing se-
curity measures will result in a reduced number of breaches. The cybersecurity 
breaches survey of 2020 shows that breaches and attacks have increased in the 
last three years.59 Industry feedback during the NIS Review also confirmed the 
cyber threat level has increased. Fewer negative impacts have been experi-
enced from those breaches so the resilience to attacks appears to have im-
proved, however continuous improvement is not evidenced, with policies and 
processes put in place to meet new regulations being maintained rather than 
enhanced.60 
In 2020, the UK proposed some amendments to their NIS Regulations that 
showed a move away from penalties. The penalty bands have been revised and 
a notice of intention to impose a penalty must be given by CA first. This prefer-
ence was also expressed in interviews through discussion of the “use of regula-
tory judgement” while assessing compliance and the intention to “lead with a 
carrot more than with a stick.” The supply chain issues have a wider impact than 
just NIS organisations, so policymakers are looking separately at the role of gov-
ernment in reducing supply chain risks at scale, and what would constitute ef-
fective support from government with managing the supply chain risks that OES 
are currently responsible for.61 
6.2 Regulator Perspective 
This section describes the general perspective of CAs, gathered from our inter-
views, along with some examples of specific approaches. Utilising the CAF from 
NCSC and based on likely threat scenarios, CAs set expectations on OES with a 
CAF profile for their sector, using red/amber/green notation to highlight the pri-
orities to be achieved. CAs assess the performance of OES to decide a priority 
for audits and inspections. A range of parameters are used for this, including: 
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• likely consequences or impact of an OES being non-compliant 
• safety considerations 
• self-assessment of OES 
• previous knowledge of the facility 
• size of facility and importance to the sector. 
One CA is using a matrix approach to assess the complexity of different facil-
ities. They assign a complexity level to decide which sites they need to audit. 
They also decide how much time each facility should be given by auditors based 
on their latest performance review. On-going improvement and therefore the 
frequency of audits is also determined through this performance-based over-
sight. 
CAs expect operators to be actively sourcing threat information, to having 
ongoing vulnerability and threat awareness and a decision-making process to 
consider new threats at the level of impact. The consequences of new threats 
are considered alongside measures that are in place to decide necessary im-
provements and likely effects. The end user is expected to tie it all up, the supply 
chain vulnerabilities and latest threat intelligence into a potential impact on 
their deployment environment, to conclude how to respond. 
CAs consider a range of parameters when assessing sites including the safety 
impact for the site and the community around. They inspect their NIS sites 
against all the NIS contributing outcomes from A1a through to D2, relative to 
the CAF profile they have set for their sector. An example from one CA shows 
each site is given a score and the extent of their NIS compliance is assigned a 
category from 1 to 6 as shown in Table 5. The scores help to decide appropriate 
enforcement levels, for example where compliance has some gaps, a letter 
specifying actions to be resolved is provided with follow up to ensure actions 
are implemented. Where compliance is poor, formal legal powers are exercised 
to enforce the required compliance. ‘Regulatory judgment’ is also applied to 
their response, through the CA knowing the site history, realistic expenditure 
such that an agreed approach can be reached. 
The supply chain aspect is in its early stages of maturity. NIS sites broadly 
know who their suppliers are, and are setting baseline requirements with con-
trol system and safety system vendors but these are not in contracts; yet formal 
assurance of suppliers is work in progress. Big suppliers of control and safety 
systems have a strong awareness of how cyberthreats can affect their equip-
ment. More recent control systems installations have security included by de-
fault. There is less understanding among sites on how to improve security 
around legacy systems. Actions and enforcements have enabled changes in this 
area to improve processes and network architecture, with OES engaging with 
their supply chain as they progress. 
There is a wide range of situations with the sites, some more proactive or 
with more resources to improve compliance, others tend to wait for CA visit and 
then make the necessary changes. Some sites are heavily committed to one 
supplier, using the same vendor for control and safety systems for an integrated  
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Table 5. Example of NIS Compliance categories being used by CA.  
OES Score OES Category Consequence from CA 
10 Beyond NIS Compliance  
20 Fully NIS Compliant  
30 Broadly NIS Compliant Action to resolve 
40 Poor Compliance Action to resolve 
50 Very Poor Formal enforcement 
60 Unacceptable Formal enforcement 
 
solution and consistency with support and spares. Other sites are using a range 
of equipment requiring systems to be integrated by a different supplier and in-
volving a more disparate and complex cybersecurity solution. 
Despite a quantity of outsourcing, the legal duty for cybersecurity sits with 
the OES. They are expected to be an ‘intelligent customer,’ to know enough to 
ask the right questions and set the required expectations on suppliers. This can 
be challenging for smaller sites with fewer resources for this. 
In some cases, it comes down to one person having responsibility for safety 
and security, managing changes and making improvements and also being com-
petent in 3rd party assurance. 
While most vendors and suppliers have some understanding of cybersecurity 
issues and that they need to be aware of vulnerabilities in their systems, the 
regulation has been necessary to push the end users into setting this into con-
tractual arrangements. Some level of standardisation of expectations on the 
supply chain would be useful, as the range of issues is largely similar for end 
users and suppliers. A certification process would assist end users to understand 
the security capability in products and services they are using and demonstrate 
assurance of vendor solutions through validation by an independent entity. The 
EU Cybersecurity Act is introducing a scheme to certify devices and services. 
This will involve third party certification of ICT products at two security assur-
ance levels: ‘substantial’ and ‘high.’ It also includes certification of Protection 
Profiles, being an implementation-independent set of security requirements. 
6.3 Perspectives of Operators of Essential Services (OES) 
Operators of Essential Services (OES) are implementing the NIS principles and 
are required to report incidents that affect the delivery of their essential ser-
vices. Our interviewees expressed that having obligations under the NIS Di-
rective has given OES a strong focus to improve their cybersecurity capability 
and raise awareness in their organisations and essentially to achieve support at 
Board Level for making the necessary improvements. Nevertheless OES, in gen-
eral, have limited resources for overseeing supply chain risks and, as individual 
organisations, can often lack negotiating power with suppliers.62 
OES are managing cybersecurity across multiple suppliers and updating sup-
plier contracts is a gradual process. Their visibility of supply chain cybersecurity 
is limited such that incidents in the supply chain may not be notified to an OES. 
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In some cases, there is a low cybersecurity maturity among available suppliers 
or even dependency on a single supplier for essential product. OES working in-
dividually appear to lack real influence to demand greater levels of assurance. 
In addition, improving the diversity of suppliers may not be more resilient if dif-
ferent suppliers share common components or the same operating system. 
During the procurement process, questionnaires are sent to potential suppli-
ers to understand their cybersecurity maturity level. The suppliers’ responses 
are considered, alongside other business risks, during procurement decisions. 
The questionnaires being used are predominantly assessing a supplier’s cyber-
security posture as a company by looking at how cybersecurity risks are man-
aged; if security policies and processes are implemented; and how effective 
they see their cybersecurity controls to be. 
However, the residual risk that the OES is carrying relates to their cyber risk 
in operation so the cyber-assurance of the supplier’s product or service needs 
to be the focus, more than the supplier company itself. These questionnaires 
are informing risk decisions inside the operator on criticality and importance. It 
is therefore necessary to look at the context of an OES deployment and the im-
pact a supply chain event would have in this specific OES environment, and to 
know how important that product or service is to the business function and to 
establish the extent of dependency on that supplier. By also looking at the de-
gree of access a supplier has to sensitive assets, this further paints the picture 
of how exposed an OES is to a supplier’s cyber risks. 
Table 6 highlights the key challenges discovered in our interviews that OES 
face in securing their supply chains to comply with NIS. Due to the limited influ-
ence, an OES has working at this on their own, there has been a growing interest 
 
Table 6. Supply Chain challenges of OES.  
Key challenges faced by OES in securing Supply Chains 
OES have a limited ability to negotiate security requirements from suppliers. 
OES lack choice in selecting suppliers – they shoulder the risk of low cybersecurity 
maturity among available suppliers.  
Difficulty obtaining supplier commitment to improvements following risk assess-
ments. 
Facing challenges with inserting cybersecurity requirements into established con-
tracts at renewal. 
Limited resources to integrate cyber security requirements and expectations into all 
outsourced activities. 
Visibility of sub-contractors is very limited.  
Supply chain incidents may not be notified to the OES.  
Uncertainties around security status of products – there is lack of transparency on 
through life support.  
Uncertainties over shared responsibilities in operations, complex dependencies. 
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to collaborate. For example, to discuss shared security requirements that could 
be built into suppliers’ offerings rather than cybersecurity add-ons being sold 
separately to each OES; to have cybersecurity included in technical require-
ments so that the fundamentals are in place and it is priced with cybersecurity 
included. OES are looking for support beyond initial warranty, for the life of an 
asset. There is a lack of clarity and transparency on the through life support for 
the security of products leaving uncertainties around the security status of 
products. While the Operators of Essential Services are the necessary focal point 
of NIS, it is a complex task for OES to assign appropriate requirements and re-
sponsibilities onto suppliers and systems integrators. Suppliers are also receiv-
ing multiple different questionnaires from different operators to assess their 
cybersecurity capability which is reducing the efficiency of supply chain assur-
ance activity for all parties. 
While NIS has brought a one company approach to improving cybersecurity 
one OES at a time, there are areas where a combined approach needs to be 
facilitated. It would involve a significant overhead of cost and time for each OES 
to attend to the cybersecurity of their entire supply chain, or even just the crit-
ical suppliers on which their essential service depends. The NIS implementation 
has mobilised some collaborations to work towards NIS outcomes more effec-
tively, highlighting the importance of partnership to achieve cybersecurity. Re-
cent working groups have been fostering collaborations to this effect. These are 
described in Section 7. 
6.4 Supplier Perspective 
The weighting of this perspective is towards suppliers with a strong presence in 
CNI and who are focussed on cybersecurity; hence, they were more willing to 
participate in interviews. Table 7 outlines some of the key challenges raised by 
suppliers. 
Suppliers that offer a good standard of cybersecurity in their offering can be 
penalised when cybersecurity is considered, but not prioritised, in the procure-
ment process and where there is an emphasis on keeping costs down. Also,  
 
Table 7. Challenges experienced by Suppliers.  
Key challenges faced by Suppliers 
Suppliers are receiving multiple different questionnaires from different operators to 
assess their cybersecurity capability. 
Cybersecurity is considered by OES but not prioritised in their procurement process. 
An emphasis on keeping costs down is encouraging an installation that is right for 
today rather than future proof infrastructure. 
Where cybersecurity requirements are not adequately defined by OES, suppliers are 
left to estimate the risk appetite and cybersecurity level they need to meet for their 
customer’s context.  
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where cybersecurity requirements are not adequately defined by OES, suppliers 
are left to estimate the risk appetite and cybersecurity level they need to meet 
for their customer’s context. 
Suppliers need OES to agree and provide common requirements per sector 
to ensure basic security is in place across all supplier offerings. OES jointly agree-
ing and providing common security requirements in one sector has been very 
well received by suppliers. For that sector, it created a more level playing field 
and a standard expectation that prevented a race to the bottom on security for 
best cost solution. Suppliers are showing a preference for their market being 
driven by the cybersecurity requirements per sector, defined by OES. However, 
even at the requirements stage, OES can require dialogue with their suppliers 
in order to fully define their requirements, to bring a supplier’s deep knowledge 
of their product together with operator’s understanding of the environment it 
is deployed into. There are concerns among OES that their security require-
ments could force a significant technology change. Large suppliers know their 
equipment is embedded into an OES so they can charge for security improve-
ments because it would be a massive undertaking for the OES to change sup-
plier. 
Suppliers are seeing an increasing interest in having cybersecurity capability 
within their products coming from the manufacturing sector. However, in NIS 
regulated sectors, they see a cultural aspect that is slowing down cybersecurity 
improvements. In particular, there is an intense focus on costs in one sector that 
encourages an installation that is right for today, rather than deploying future 
proof infrastructure. Where cybersecurity responsibility has been given to IT, 
there can be a limited understanding of the extent of their cybersecurity re-
sponsibilities within the operational environment. 
While the responsibility for implementing and complying with the NIS Di-
rective is with the OES, there is reluctance from suppliers to take on cybersecu-
rity responsibilities that sit in the context of OES deployments. However, there 
needs to be a fair set of expectations on suppliers for example to have cyberse-
curity designed into their products and services and the OES take responsibility 
for how cybersecurity capability is configured and used in their environment. 
Some collaboration and negotiation will be required to agree what can be ex-
pected and included as standard within a supplier offering and what is consid-
ered as additional and chargeable as an extra. Both the operators and suppliers 
need more clarity on the cybersecurity practices to adopt and a shared under-
standing of the current and emerging cybersecurity risks, as increasing digitali-
sation progresses. 
7. Examples of Interorganizational Cooperation for Cybersecurity 
Two-way relationships between operators of critical infrastructure and the sup-
pliers of products and services they use are an important consideration. Cyber 
security issues in the supply chain can introduce risks and potential operational 
impact that the operator needs to manage. An operational incident could also 
impact the reputation of a supplier. The translation of an operator’s regulatory 
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obligation into security requirements of suppliers can to some extent be incor-
porated into commercial contracts and in this way allocate some responsibilities 
to suppliers. A continuing relationship with suppliers is necessary to support cy-
bersecurity needs such as patching of software and incident response arrange-
ments and particularly throughout the lifecycle of products. Consideration of 
how the relationship will endure over time, the potential needs in the longer 
term and how they can be met through likely changes.63 
7.1 Unified Supply Chain Assurance 
Although the focus of this paper has been on the UK response to NIS implemen-
tation, the concerns extend across national borders. For example, the European 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) industry has worked together to produce a uni-
fied approach to supply chain assurance. Table 8 shows the supply chain aspect 
of the maturity model that was developed to compare the suppliers to Air Nav-
igation Service Providers (ANSP). The levels define a progression from partial to 
full oversight of suppliers, and from self-assessment to carrying out compliance 
checks. The eventual aim is to achieve an adaptive security that supports regular 
updates to requirements and independent assessments of suppliers. 
Figure 3 provides an example for presenting the comparison of suppliers in 
order of maturity. The intention was for ATM operators to progress towards 
achieving full oversight of their supply chain by following this unified approach. 
Since the introduction of this unified maturity model and the NIS obligations, 
there has been some progress with the oversight of supply chains through 
achieving a partial understanding of supplier maturity. However, to take actions  
 
Table 8. Supply Chain category of ATM Maturity Model.64  
Supply Chain Risk Management 
The organisation’s priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are estab-
lished and used to support risk decisions associated with managing supply chain risk. 
The organisation has in place the processes to identify, assess and manage supply 




No complete overview of all suppliers / partners. 
Level 1 
partial 
Some requirements placed on some suppliers and agreements with 




Minimum set of requirements placed on all critical suppliers and agree-
ments with partners, with mostly self-assessment for compliance.  
Level 3 
assured 
Requirements placed on suppliers with proportionate compliance checks 
and processes / penalties /measures for non-compliance.  
Level 4 
adaptive 
Independent reviews / audits / assessments supporting regular updates 
of requirements against new good practices. 




Figure 3: Unified approach to supply chain assurance for ANSP.65 
 
towards improvement required a gathering of the key issues from operators so 
that visits and workshops with key suppliers could be arranged at a country level 
coordinated by the CAA. 
7.2 Collaborative Supplier Assurance 
The effective implementation of the NIS Directive and resulting improvement in 
cybersecurity across critical infrastructure is contextually dependent on the 
knowledge of each operator’s own environment and unique deployment of in-
frastructure. The necessity of focusing the NIS Directive on the activities of in-
dividual organisations has produced an array of individual responses. This was 
an important aspect of the NIS Guidance, by providing outcomes to aim for ra-
ther than a checklist of actions to ensure the efforts were towards the reduction 
of risks for each operational facility. As this effort rippled out, a knock-on effect 
to suppliers was receiving multiple different questionnaires from their custom-
ers to assess their cybersecurity. 
This overhead of activity, for both OES and suppliers, to understand the risks 
in the supply chain can be reduced through improved cooperation. Groups of 
OES in the energy sector were discussing their common security requirements 
with suppliers, one at a time. This developed into a supplier assurance working 
group to agree a common approach for the whole energy sector, supported by 
Government. This collaboration has produced and agreed a set of guidance for 
the sector on supplier assurance. This working group is also working on a code 
of practice and partnership approach with suppliers to the energy sector. 
Sector collaborations can improve OES leverage with larger suppliers. Agree-
ment of common security requirements per sector by OES can provide a more 
level playing field for the supplier market. Defining clear security requirements 
at a whole sector level should improve negotiations with sole suppliers to meet 
them, despite not having the competition within the market to improve their 
security provision. Where possible, a more centralised coordination of supplier 
assurance is recommended by introducing a shared assessment process within 
each sector with one assessment per supplier to improve efficiencies in this 
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area. A trusted intermediary in such partnerships has been particularly effective 
to establish a picture for the sector, by anonymising information from individual 
OES. 
7.3 Centralised Supplier Assurance 
The Scottish Government have provided an example of a centralised supplier 
assessment process within the health sector through their digital telecare secu-
rity assessments.66 The key aims and outcomes have been as follows: 
• for consistency and to reduce the burden of providing evidence to multiple 
parties 
• to increase supplier engagement 
• to reduce the cost of supplier assurance 
• to use a risk-based assessment of product/service and supplier company 
• to build trust between the assessor and suppliers 
• to establish a non-disclosure agreement due to vulnerabilities identified 
during the assurance process 
• to offer guidance, as necessary, for suppliers to achieve the required stand-
ard 
• to agree timely improvements where required. 
7.4 Managing Software Vulnerabilities 
Complex supply chains can propagate vulnerabilities. Without a software bill of 
materials (SBOM), it is more difficult to know if vulnerable software is in a de-
vice. Risk mitigation requires a detailed and dynamic asset inventory to hold 
information for each device, on vendors, operating system, firmware version 
etc. The risk surface also depends on the context surrounding a device so the 
actual impact of a vulnerability depends on the environment a targeted device 
is implemented in.67 
New software vulnerabilities can be embedded within many components and 
users need to know if they will be affected by a software vulnerability through 
regular assurance of a SBOM. SAFEcode produced an assurance model that in-
cludes: 
• security – anticipate and address vulnerabilities during design 
• integrity – in sourcing and creating software components, address the like-
lihood of vulnerabilities in delivery of software 
• authenticity – provide ways to assure and differentiate genuine products 
from counterfeit products.68 
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) with U.S. Department of Commerce’s National 
Technology and Information Administration (NTIA) is at the nexus of a discus-
sion with software vendors, security experts and asset owners. NTIA are facili-
tating this effort with different sectors: health, energy, automotive and banking 
with an emphasis on cooperation rather than using regulations. This involves 
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the application of SBOM as a tool to minimise supply chain risks, to know the 
components of software so that vulnerabilities become known and to work with 
suppliers to mitigate them. Sector specific engagement will uncover the im-
portance of an element to that sector and potential impact to a sector of a vul-
nerable supply chain component. Cross sector engagement will also be neces-
sary because different CNI sectors are likely to have the same software compo-
nents embedded in their systems. The intention is to develop a shared vision 
and language working with individual sectors first and to work towards creating 
machine readable methods for fast automatic assessment of impact and to en-
able sharing across sectors.69 
7.5 Cyber Exercises with Suppliers 
A recent victim of attacks reported that exposure to incidents has significantly 
increased awareness across the organisation. Any phishing attempt “echoes” 
through our organisation, sharing of near misses or potential incidents happens 
much faster. Exercises in responding to cybersecurity events can provide a ho-
listic experience to identify capability gaps from people, process and technology 
perspectives. Whole sector cyber exercises have increased awareness of the 
need to respond collectively to cyber events and the benefits of collaborative 
working across OES, suppliers and government. Participants in the cyber exer-
cises appreciated gaining visibility of the bigger picture and understanding of 
how local decisions can impact the wider sector. It exposed the need for a co-
ordination role, by Government or an industry body, to deal with sector wide 
incidents, rather than being treated as several incidents by many separate or-
ganisations. It raised supplier awareness of the necessity to support CNI with 
NIS compliance and even to revisit contractual agreements with individual OES 
to consider extending them in some areas towards whole sector agreements. 
8. Enhancing Cooperation in Securing Supply Chains 
In addition to specific NIS Guidance, the UK NCSC provide general supply chain 
security guidance to improve overall resilience and reduce business disrup-
tions.70 This is offered in four stages as listed in Table 9. Our research recom-
mends some enhancements to this guidance, based on the experiences of im-
plementing NIS across critical infrastructure, that are listed in Table 9 and elab-
orated below. These recommendations aim to improve effective interworking 
across supply chains. 
 
Table 9. Enhancements to Supply Chain Guidance.  
NCSC Supply Chain principles Enhancements to Supply Chain 
Guidance 
Understand the Risks Emphasis on risk reduction 
Establish Control Driving improvements 
Check your arrangements Measures & Performance 
Continuous improvement Mutual Commitment & Accountability 
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8.1 Emphasis on Risk Reduction 
Rather than an emphasis on increasing maturity or adding capability, it is im-
portant that decisions continue to be based on reducing risks and minimising 
the impact of incidents. To really know and understand the supply chain risks to 
critical infrastructure requires improved information sharing and cooperation 
across industry and across supply networks. This would assist with understand-
ing the latest threat picture, of incidents and near misses, and with identifying 
the impact of vulnerabilities at a sector level, such as software vulnerabilities in 
supply chain components. 
In addition to the emphasis on managing and reducing risks for the assets 
relevant to delivering essential services, further attention could be given to the 
impact beyond NIS identified assets, by considering the cyber resilience of the 
entire organisation, as a whole, to include the human and process effects on 
these critical assets and the delivery of essential services. 
8.2 Driving Improvements 
While the NCSC supply chain guidance places attention on establishing control 
of the supply chain, this research has highlighted some challenges for OES work-
ing alone with achieving that level of control. Therefore, balancing controls with 
cooperation is recommended and approaches to achieving this have been ex-
plored. It is essential to establish the new behaviours that will drive improve-
ments and reduce the risks. Sector collaborations can improve OES leverage 
with suppliers. For example, by OES together agreeing common security re-
quirements, to lead their sector’s supplier market. A combined supplier assur-
ance process can also reduce the overhead of this activity on both OES and sup-
pliers. More resources will be required to consider essential components of the 
supply chain and to facilitate an assured software bill of materials SBOM and 
know the impact of vulnerabilities in supply chain elements. 
In addition to holding an asset inventory that covers hardware, software, and 
connectivity to support security initiatives such as patching and assessing im-
pact of vulnerabilities, an inventory of supplier relationships is recommended 
to cover the human and process elements as well and recognise the supply 
chain as a strategic asset to be managed. Again, sector wide cooperation could 
establish the foundation for ongoing relations with suppliers through agreeing 
a sector code of practice. The individual operator-supplier relationships can 
then focus on more contextual needs related to OES deployments in their 
unique operational environments. 
Understanding the areas of commonality indicates what can be achieved col-
lectively per sector. This will require Government support for the necessary col-
laborations, for example cyber exercises involving suppliers to improve integra-
tion of incident response processes. Governments can positively impact the 
long-term goal of cybersecurity improvements by supporting or facilitating such 
interorganizational cooperation. 
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8.3 Measures & Performance 
A collective responsibility and mutual commitment to cybersecurity is the 
means to establish the required behaviours and improvements. By understand-
ing the potential impact of supply chain components on CNI, suppliers can be 
categorized as critical, important, medium or low priority.71 In order to track 
and measure improvements, points of governance or points of influence need 
to be identified within the supply network, where controls or cooperation are 
required with critical and important suppliers. 
Similar to the six-monthly review of NIS improvement plans with OES that are 
overseen by the CA, there also needs to be a regular review of commitments to 
maintain accountability with suppliers. To be more efficient on time and re-
sources, and with the required interorganizational cooperation in place, this can 
largely be an attention to sector wide commitments from the supply chain. Then 
individual OES attention can be on their more contextual and tailored require-
ments. Agreeing shared language will also be necessary to facilitate the collab-
oration across organisations. 
Table 10 shows examples of actions that all depend on effective cooperation. 
Using a balance of lagging and leading measures to assess performance and 
guide improvements, will inform future decisions while learning from events. 
 
Table 10. Cooperation in performance.  
Lagging indicators  
to learn from the past:  
Leading indicators  
to inform decisions:  
• Reporting of incidents and 
their impact 
• Ability to recover from 
events 
• Sharing of lessons learned 
to plan improvements 
• Responsible disclosure of 
newly discovered vulnera-
bilities 
• Tracking the resolution of 
vulnerabilities or the re-
quired mitigations 
• Knowing what to improve, improvement 
plans assessing performance. The subjective 
assessments assigning red, amber or green 
could instead be linked to more specific and 
measurable milestones in the improvement 
plans 
• Consider what-if scenarios and potential dis-
ruptions, emerging threats, early signs of vul-
nerabilities, and near misses. This needs im-
proved coordination and cooperation to 
guide these preparations 
• Improved visibility of dependencies on supply 
chain components, to prevent supply chain 
effects cascading 
• Understand the residual risks being carried by 
OES to prioritise their mitigation 
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8.4 Mutual Commitment & Accountability 
Figure 4 demonstrates the collective commitment that is required across public-
private partnerships involving OESs, Suppliers and Government departments. 
A code of practice per sector would establish the commitment to action. A 
definition of and regular review of commitments will maintain accountability 
among sector participants. For example, broadening the current individual OES 
improvement plans by also overseeing sector improvements and mutual com-
mitments in the interorganizational space. In the longer term, it is a continual 
adaptation to the evolving situation, by the whole supply chain network, that 
will improve resilience to cyber events. 
9. Conclusion 
This paper has evaluated public and private sector experiences with implement-
ing the NIS Directive, and provided examples of effective cybersecurity collabo-
rations. It has presented some enhancements to supply chain guidance to assist 
with reducing cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure and emphasizes the 
need for greater interorganizational cooperation. 
In particular, the OES context of deployment and operational impact makes it 
harder for OES to share cybersecurity responsibility with suppliers for products 
and services that OES are hosting in their own operational environment. The 
ability of OES to make formal upfront arrangements with suppliers through 
contractual agreements is limited, not least due to the adaptability to an evolve- 
 
Figure 4: Mutual Commitment required from Public & Private actors. 
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ing situation that is required. Fostering trusted partnerships and mutual com-
mitments is equally important and even has the potential to achieve more than 
formal agreements. 
The regulatory controls introduced by NIS need to be balanced with a more 
cooperative approach through Government support for the necessary collabo-
rations that will drive improvements. It is also important that common lan-
guage, standards and frameworks are used to promote shared understanding 
along the supply chain. To incentivise suppliers, a greater clarity on sector cy-
bersecurity requirements is needed to set the level and lead supplier markets. 
This research recommends a combination of control and cooperation mech-
anisms, developed from researching industry experiences and supported by 
supply chain management literature. Future work will evaluate the effective-
ness of industry working groups cooperating across public and private organi-
sations to improve cybersecurity. We are also concerned to validate our argu-
ments by more detailed interviews and focus groups with stakeholders across 
Europe and beyond as nations across the world struggle to address shared prob-
lems of supply chain assurance in national critical infrastructures. Future re-
search will include a capabilities-based engineering analysis to investigate the 
effective engagement of sector wide supply networks in continuous adaptation 
to cybersecurity. 
To build and maintain the required cybersecurity capability to secure essen-
tial services and refine those capabilities in the light of new threats and vulner-
abilities, organisations, products, and services must understand their role in 
critical infrastructure and their place and responsibility in the supply chain. 
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